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Panic figured prominently in the headlines of British dailies printed for the morning of July 8, 
2005:   
The Daily Mirror:  
“07/07: Terror In London: WE'RE GOING TO DIE! WE'RE GOING TO DIE! ; Cries 
pierce choking air as survivors flee twisted wreckage of Tube trains” (Moyes, 2005)  
The Times: 
 “Panic, shoving, fear of fire and bonding below ground” (Hamilton, 2005) 
The Guardian: 
 “Attack on London: Aldgate: Stunned silence, darkness, panic, then calm: 8.51am” 
(Henning, 2005)  
 
Articles drew heavily on eyewitness accounts to reconstruct, for a curious readership, the 
scenes which unfolded when three explosions erupted near simultaneously in the London 
Underground followed by a fourth blast, less than an hour later, on a city bus during the busy 
rush hour of the previous morning.  The stories told were mixed.  Ray Wright, a relief train 
driver, described a "sea of blackened faces in a state of total panic" (BBC News, 2005b).  
“There was immediately smoke everywhere and it was hot and everybody panicked. People 
thought they were just going to suffocate" told another witness (Muir & Cowan, 2005).  
Others, however, focused on the instances of cooperation, solidarity, and ‘heroism’; acts 
which many articles were quick to suggest demonstrated a resurgence of the ‘blitz-spirit’ in 
the very place where many Londoners had gathered to seek cover from aerial bombardment 
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half a century earlier.  "There was no panic, especially when people realised they were OK. 
Everyone then bonded together and helped each other. Then we got out and saw the second 
carriage. There was blood and stuff everywhere; it wasn't pretty" (Hamilton, 2005). 
 
In the months that followed, these journalistic accounts would be supplemented by academic 
research offering a more sober and unanimous description of the forms of social behaviour 
which manifest in the unfolding of this emergency.  Survivors were frightened, the studies 
suggested, but resilient (Cocking, Drury, & Reicher, 2009; Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009; 
Sheppard, Rubin, Wardman, & Wessely, 2006; Wessely, 2005a).  Individuals remained calm 
(Cocking et al., 2009; Drury et al., 2009; Wessely, 2005b) and organised themselves in an 
orderly manner (Cocking et al., 2009; Drury et al., 2009).  Rational decisions were made on 
the limited information available (Sheppard et al., 2006).  Survivors recalled an 
overwhelming sense of unity amongst strangers gathered in in the darkened underground 
(Cocking et al., 2009; Drury et al., 2009).  Cooperation, compassion and mutual assistance, 
prevailed over selfishness and competition (Cocking et al., 2009; Drury et al., 2009; Wessely, 
2005a).  Social norms and values—far from breaking down—become more pronounced.  
Longer-term studies concluded that the psychological effects of 7/7 were short-lived with few 
members of the population experiencing any lasting stress or trauma (Page, Rubin, Amlôt, 
Simpson, & Wessely, 2008; Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005).  Even 
financial markets rebounded quickly (BBC News, 2005a; London Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 2005; Washington Post, 2005).  While some suggested that a historical 
experience with terrorism, and perhaps even the memory of the war-time Blitz, had 
contributed to a particular immunity to panic amongst Londoners (Sheppard et al., 2006; 
Wessely, 2005a, 2005c), researchers broadly agreed that social behaviour in emergencies was 
3 
 
generally more resilient than is commonly thought.  Panic, disaster researchers proclaimed, is 
a myth (Clarke, 2002; Johnson, 1985; Keating, 1982; Sheppard et al., 2006; Tierney, 2003). 
 
The mythologization of panic represents an enormously significant event in the history of 
emergency governance.  Panic has long functioned as a principle problem guiding the 
activities of emergency planners.  Indeed, the rapid transmission of panic across populations 
was understood to exacerbate, and often supercede, the dangers posed by the triggering event.  
Philip Mitchiner, writing in The British Medical Journal advised in 1938 that “[i]n the case of 
gas bombing, as indeed with any bombing, it is panic among the civil population which is 
most to be feared” (Mitchiner, 1938: 93)  An Office of Civil Defence publication from 1951 
entitled Panic Control and Panic Prevention warns that “[m]ass panic can produce more 
danger to life and property than any number of atomic bombs” (Office of Civil Defence, 
1951: 71).  The threat of panic thus demanded and legitimised the exercise of a whole 
assemblage of governmental techniques designed to maintain or restore social order in an 
unfolding emergency.  Hadley Cantril advises, in his article Causes and Control of Riot and 
Panic, “In severe cases use severe treatment to avoid panics. Threaten punishment or enforce 
strict discipline—but remember this is a last resort and not a permanent solution” (Cantril, 
1943: 678, emphasis in original).  Of course, these disciplinary forms of control were not 
uncontroversial nor did they fail to generate considerable disquiet amongst lawmakers 
concerned that mounting controls and secrecy risked sliding free and democratic states into 
authoritarianism (Hennessy, 2010; Orr, 2006). 
 
Resilience appears to offer a way out of this age-old liberal problematic which pits freedom 
against security.  It does so by premising security on the exercise of natural functions, rather 
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than on prohibitory governmental interventions.  Rather than relying on force to maintain or 
restore a precarious social order, resilience initiatives aim to foster, facilitate and optimise the 
inherent resilience of systems deemed vital to life in the 21st century.  Indeed, it is difficult to 
argue against the claim that resilience strategies represent a more humane from of governance 
than those exercised during the Cold War. Resilience strategies stress community 
participation rather than state secrecy.  They exploit human dynamism, creativity and 
freedom, instead of suppressing public panic and oppressing political dissidents.  They aim to 
harness the inherent resilience of vital systems to self-organise responses in a bottom-up 
fashion, rather than impose order in a top-down fashion.  By enjoining the positivism of 
social science with the emancipatory project of liberalism, resilience narratives position 
resilience as the fulfilment of the Enlightenment promise that an improved understanding of 
the nature of social systems will permit less governance, less control and more ‘freedom’.  
 
While one could take this positivism for granted, what if we were to remain stubbornly 
sceptical with regard to this ‘advance’ in the understanding of collective human behaviour 
and the freedom it is said to foster?  How then might we explain these transformations in 
emergency governance?  How might we understand the re-evaluation of social behaviour 
upon which these strategies are premised?  How would we explain the emergence of 
resilience?  This book offers an alternative explanation to the predominant account found in 
resilience literatures.  Resilience was not lying in wait for the march of science to provide the 
conditions for its recognition.  Nor was it concealed by the distortions of ideology which 
lifted with the culmination of the Cold War.  There is nothing natural about resilience.   
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Resilience, I argue, is the correlate of an emergent order of neoliberal governance.  Inspired 
by Foucault’s claim that the regime of power/knowledge enacted by liberal apparatuses of 
security is essentially biopolitical this book situates the emergence of resilience within 
broader shifts in the government of life.  Resilience represents a specific mode of evaluating 
life: a way of understanding what life is and what life should be.  As such, resilience also 
represents a specific way of problematizing particular lives and lifestyles.  Of course, there 
are innumerable ways in which life might be understood, evaluated and problematised.  
These varied understandings can co-exist; reinforce and contradict one another; come into 
being and disappear over time.  I am therefore less interested in determining whether 
resilience is a true or false representation of life—whether it is real or the product of 
ideology.  As a mode of evaluation, resilience clearly exists as an empirical fact.  What I am 
interested in investigating are the processes through which resilience obtained its status as a 
true and accurate measure of life.  Specifically, how did resilience become the predominant 
mode through which security discourses value life in the 21st century?  
 
To answer this question, this book performs a genealogy of resilience.  A genealogy is a 
critical inquiry into the historical conditions enabling the emergence of values.  This 
genealogy aims to render explicit the historical conditions under which resilience has risen to 
prominence as the principle value orienting neoliberal security practices in the 21st Century.  
In doing so, this genealogy challenges conventional narratives which explain the advent of 
resilience strategies on a scientifically validated re-evaluation of security referents.  
Resilience was not simply discovered as a natural property of vital systems.  It is a mode of 
valuation which was constructed over time through complex, often obscure, yet highly 
political processes.  Revealing the significant amount of work which has gone into forging 
resilience as a security value not only serves to undermine the assumption that resilience was 
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discovered but raises questions about the ‘natural’ affinity of resilience and freedom.  Far 
from absolving the need for governance, resilience initiatives have required significant 
government investment and effort. Resilience strategies have thus coincided with a 
reorientation, rather than a rolling-back, of liberal security governance to optimise the 
capacity of systems underpinning, or constitutive of, contemporary life to withstand, recover 
and bounce-back from crisis.  Resilience thus calls on government to create the conditions 
within which we may be permitted to be ‘free’. 
 
Clearly, the remit of this investigation requires a broad, interdisciplinary scope.  For the sake 
of maintaining a sufficient degree of empirical focus, I have concentrated my analysis on this 
history of the rationalities and practices of UK emergency governance.  As a site within 
which multiple, often conflicting understandings of resilience are operationalised, UK Civil 
Contingencies provides an ideal location to study how resilience has been mobilised to deal 
with emerging security challenges.  Interrogating the history of the rationalities and practices 
of UK emergency governance alerts us to the significance, and potential stakes, in the shift to 
resilience-based security policies.  Nevertheless, accounting for the emergence of resilience 
will also require us to move outside the remit of UK emergency governance to examine the 
broader social, political and epistemological transformations which have enabled the rise of 
resilience discourses.  As such, the empirical focus of this study functions both as an 
empirical site of research and a location within which to dramatise the more general historical 
processes which have afforded resilience its value. 
 
The Value(s) of Security 
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Resilience is now a ubiquitous term across a diverse array of discourses with some purchase 
in risk management.i  At its most general level resilience is understood as the capacity to 
absorb, withstand and ‘bounce-back’ quickly and efficiently from a perturbation.  It is 
considered to be both a natural property and a quality which can be improved within a broad 
array of complex adaptive systems including critical infrastructures, ecosystems, societies 
and economies through good governance.  However, as one moves across academic fields 
and specialist applications it becomes evident that multiple understandings of resilience are in 
operation.   
 
For network scientists resilience is understood as the ability of a network to maintain 
systemic integrity in the event of fault or disruption: a function of the design of network 
architectures measured in terms of system functionality following the removal of successive 
nodes and links (Lewis, 2009: 375).  Resilience is thus often associated with network 
robustness, survivability and graceful degradation with less emphasis on regeneration or self-
repair.  This understanding of resilience can be compared to psychological (Werner & Smith, 
1989, 1992) and sociological (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003; Kindt, 2006) 
understandings of resilience as a resource which permits certain individuals to overcome risks 
and/or cope with psychological trauma better than others.  Here, resilience is usually 
associated with the capacity to avoid the onset of maladaptive behaviours, such as severe 
depression, and quickly return to ‘normal’ in the wake of a crisis.  Resilience thus refers to 
the capacity to bounce-back from adversity to resume a particular way of life.   Finally, the 
concept of resilience found in ecological literatures moves one step further: referring not 
simply to the capacity to ‘bounce-back’ to an original state but advancing the possibility of 
moving to alternative stable states in a complex system (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).  As 
these authors note, enhancing resilience by optimizing the evolutionary capacity, or ‘fitness’, 
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of a system, not only increases the capacity of a system to withstand the impact of potentially 
destabilizing shocks, but also permits the system to quickly and efficiently organise so as to 
capitalise on emerging opportunities—to realise, and even produce, ‘new normals’ 
(Gunderson & Holling, 2002: 8).  In this formulation, resilience moves from a conservative 
exercise of preservation to a creative process which holds out the promise of climbing to new, 
possibly more desirable, states. 
 
Brand & Jax (2007) note that this conceptual vagueness can in fact be productive.  As a 
boundary object, the term resilience “facilitates communication across disciplinary borders 
by creating shared vocabulary although the understanding of the parties would differ 
regarding the precise meaning of the term in question” (Brand & Jax, 2007: no pagination).  
This is of clear value across the heterogeneous operations conducted under the banner of UK 
Civil Contingencies where multiple colloquial and specialist understandings of resilience can 
be identified. The conceptual vagueness of resilience has led some to refer to resilience as a 
‘perspective’  (Folke, 2006; Folke et al., 2002) or ‘paradigm’ (Anderies, Walker, & Kinzig, 
2006) rather than a concept.  Brand & Jax, however, are critical of this trend, arguing that 
diluting the conceptual clarity of resilience “may in fact be a hindrance to scientific progress” 
(2007: no pagination) and urge researchers to establish a more precise definition of resilience 
which might assist the “operationalization and application of resilience within ecological 
science” (2007: no pagination). The fixation within resilience research over definitions 
presupposes that resilience in fact exists, as a distinct, ontological property of particular 
systems.  Here, resilience (signified) is taken to be something objective, present and real in 
the world (referent) that can be more or less accurately re-presented in a concept (signifier).  
If what needs to be deduced through all the completing claims is the true sense of resilience, 
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then the academic researcher is duty-bound to uncover this sense so as to establish a standard 
against which false definitions, or illegitimate copies, could be judged and discarded.   
 
Efforts to typologise the different ways in which resilience is understood within (Brand & 
Jax, 2007; Handmer & Dovers, 1996; Masten, Best, & Garmezy, 1990) and across (Adger, 
2000; Holling, 1996) disciplines do not stray far from this logic.  While suggesting that 
multiple senses of resilience could exist, the conviction that different senses may be clearly 
distinguished and differentiated across a static table nevertheless fail to account for the varied 
ways in which resilience is used by practitioners. In practice, the meaning(s) of resilience 
continue to escape the categorical structures developed by academics.  But if resilience 
cannot be defined, this does not mean it does not make sense.  Strange—yet 
comprehensible—understandings of resilience abound in practitioner discourses which would 
no doubt shock and annoy resilience researchers desperate to secure the meaning of this 
concept.  As resilience is taken up within new academic disciplines and modified to respond 
to particular problems faced in specialist fields its meaning continues to fragment and evolve.  
Clearly, the definition of resilience is too dynamic to pin down. It thus makes little sense to 
insist on a definition of what resilience is when its own sense is still in the process of 
becoming. 
 
For researchers intent on ascribing a distinct meaning to resilience these apparent misuses of 
the term would be cause for concern.  However, thinking resilience as a boundary object 
opens the door to a different research programme.  What if instead we were to abandon the 
idea that resilience has any fixed sense?  How then might we understand resilience and its 
implications for security? Rather than approaching resilience as a concept relating to a 
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determinate sense, I study resilience as a value.  I am less concerned with what resilience 
means than how its emergence is changing the ways in which we understand and pursue 
security in the 21st century.  By treating resilience as a value, I want to acknowledge that this 
term harbours multiple, evolving and often competing senses.  Further still, I am interested in 
how the diverse ways in which resilience is understood and enacted productively contributes 
to the value of resilience within security discourses. 
 
As a value, resilience performs various functions with regards to governance.  Firstly, it 
provides a quality in relation to which systems, populations, individuals and even behaviours 
can be assessed and evaluated.  Quality, Burgess reminds us, refers both to a property which 
makes something identifiable and a statement regarding its standard of excellence (Burgess, 
2011: 32).  Resilience acts as a mark of distinction.  Attempts, currently underway, to 
establish a common metric for measuring resilience attest to the bureaucratic importance of 
these assessments (quantitative or otherwise) in allocating funding and guiding government 
policy (Birkmann, 2006; Brigilio, Cordina, Bugeja, & Farrugia, 2005).  But it should not be 
ignored that resilience also operates as a value in relation to which subjects evaluate, 
problematise and comport themselves.  Resilience is now a key term of art in self-helps books 
which provide instruction for the government of the self (Neocleous, 2013; O’Malley, 2010; 
Reid, 2012).  Resilience thus generates objectives for security governance in relation to which 
security programmes can be designed and evaluated.  Finally, the value of resilience is 
functional. The vague meaning of resilience (as noted by those who have considered 
resilience as a boundary object) facilitates the integration of diverse agencies, departments 
and actors by providing the semblance of a common objective where diverse concepts are 
necessarily being enacted.   
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Research into the value of resilience would furthermore need to recognise how resilience 
diverges from those values which formerly guided security programmes within the associated 
spheres of civil contingencies, civil defence and the military.  Indeed, one of the more 
remarkable aspects of the emergence of resilience discourses is how they have coincided with 
the problematisation of the virtues of fortitude, robustness and stoicism traditionally 
associated with security (O’Malley, 2010).  Security programmes rooted in the logic of 
protection are increasingly accused of generating forms of dependency which contribute to 
the very conditions of insecurity they had been mobilised to eradicate.  In their place, 
qualities associated with resilience such as malleability, adaptability, flexibility and 
regeneration are now being actively promoted.  These transformations in the political 
economy of security values clearly demonstrate that what is at stake in the proliferation of 
resilience discourses is not simply the practices through which security is pursued.  
Coinciding with a shift in what is recognised as secure is a more profound transformation in 
the semantic meaning of security and the value afforded to it.  In light of these observations 
we should be prompted to ask: how can we account for the emergence of resilience as a 
security value?  The next section outlines the genealogical method employed by this study to 
answer this question. 
 
Genealogy and the Critique of Values: 
 
Deleuze described genealogy as the ‘true realisation of critique’ (1983: 1).  For while Kant 
advanced critique to determine the legitimate limits of the authority of institutions including 
the Church and the State, he could not bring himself to critically reflect upon the values in 
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whose service this critical project was mobilised.  Kant, in short, failed to critically reflect 
upon the Enlightenment value of truth. Instead, critique was subsumed within a critical 
project designed to locate the limits of what was knowable in order to establish a secure 
foundation for truth.  Genealogy would liberate critique from its service within this 
Enlightenment security project.  Rather than securing values, most especially that of truth, 
critique would be folded back upon them.  Genealogy is critical history. It traces the 
historical emergence of things “we tend to feel [are] without history” (Foucault, 1994: 369): 
values including truth and security.  As a critique of values, genealogy is directed towards the 
problem of accounting for the value of values.  A genealogy of resilience thus aims to 
uncover the historical processes through which resilience obtained its value and status within 
contemporary security discourses. 
 
Nietzsche rejected the idea that the foundation of values could somehow be located outside 
the subject. There is no absolute, transcendent source of value and nothing has value-in-itself.  
Instead he would understand values to be the product of processes of valuation ultimately 
rooted within particular modes of understanding and experiencing the world.  Yet, as much as 
Nietzsche was critical of those who located a transcendent source for values, he was equally 
severe to those who sought to explain the values of values through simple utilitarian calculus 
which presumed that these processes were immediately identifiable (Nietzsche, 1968: 164, 
385, 1989: Pt. 6).  Values are rarely the product of self-evident rationalizations of a subject 
who values.  Values, Nietzsche aimed to demonstrate, come into being over long historical 
periods as they are recalled, reactivated and reproduced within particular modes of 
evaluation.  Deleuze notes that this  
“implies a critical reversal.  On the one hand, values appear or are given as principles: 
and evaluations presuppose values on the basis of which phenomena are appraised.  
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But, on the other hand and more profoundly, it is values which presuppose evaluations, 
‘perspectives of appraisal’, from which their own value is derived.” (Deleuze, 1983: 1) 
 
It is clear within Nietzsche’s writing that these processes of valuing—these evaluations—
were what ultimately preoccupied him.  “Formerly one said of every morality: ‘By their fruit 
ye shall know them.’  I say of every morality: ‘it is a fruit by which I recognize the soil from 
which it sprang’” (Nietzsche, 1968: 149). 
 
Evaluations distinguish values.  Value is produced (to be distinguished) through the act of 
differentiating values and value systems (to distinguish between).  In this sense, Deleuze 
explains that evaluation can be defined as 
“the differential element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and 
creative.  Evaluations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence 
of those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of 
which they judge.  This is why we always have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that 
we deserve given our way of being or our style of life.” (Deleuze, 1983: 1)  
 
If values are simultaneously produced and reproduced through particular modes of being, 
then processes of value creation are, in turn, correlative with the unfolding of ways of being 
in the world.  Evaluations which distinguish new values support alternative ways of life.  This 
opening of a space between different values and evaluations is critical insofar as it is creative.  
This space—the ‘pathos of distance’ at the origin’ (Foucault, 1994; Nietzsche, 1989: 201, 
2007: 11)—is constitutive of new perspectives of appraisal, new forms of evaluation, and 
thus new forms of life.  This differential element, so intrinsic to the exercise of evaluation, is 
in Nietzsche’s writings termed ‘the will to power’. 
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The will to power is defined by Deleuze as "the genealogical element of force, both 
differential and genetic" (Deleuze, 1983: 46).  It is the ultimate source of all value; that which 
differentiates modes of being.  If the source of value comes from the will to power, then the 
measure of value lies in the affective feeling of ‘enhanced and organized power’(Deleuze, 
1983: 57-59; Nietzsche, 1968: 356).  Yet, we must be careful not to psychologise these 
processes.  It is not subjects who consciously will power.  “Who therefore will power? An 
absurd question, if being is by itself will to power” (Nietzsche as quoted in Deleuze, 1983: 
46).  It is the will to power which produces values, peoples, nations, and consequently 
subjects.  While ultimately rooted within subjectivities, processes of value creation thus 
simultaneously precede and exceed the individual subject. 
 
Recalling Nietzsche’s writings on the will to knowledge helps to clarify the relations between 
evaluation, the will to power and truth.  The will to know, Nietzsche makes clear, is a 
manifestation of the will to power.  The formation of reason and logic is an imposition onto 
the world proceeding from the need “[n]ot ‘to know’ but to schematize – to impose upon 
chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require” (Nietzsche, 1968: 278).  
Processes of ordering, or rending familiar are necessary fictions imposed upon the world as 
“only when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become calculable and useful to 
us” (Nietzsche, 1968: 278).  Schemas of knowledge thus proceed from evaluations which 
distinguish what is useful from what is not.  “The valuation ‘I believe that this and that is so’ 
as the essence of truth” (Nietzsche, 1968: 275).  At the same time, particular modes of 
knowing and valuing are always contested by alternative modes of evaluation which threaten 
to bend such schemas to their own will.  Deleuze thus ascribes the sense of a phenomenon to 
“the force which appropriates it” adding “the history of a thing, in general, is the succession 
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of forces which take possession of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for 
possession” (Deleuze, 1983: 3).  
 
With genealogy, values are recognised as signs, or symptoms, of a hierarchy of forces which 
must itself be diagnosed (Nietzsche, 2007: 7-8).  I understand this order of force relations to 
constitute a political economy.  Following Foucault, a political economy is taken to be a self-
managing order: a “multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization” (Foucault, 1998: 92).  Note that this 
understanding of political economy is defined less in terms of the exchange of equivalences 
(as in classical liberal economics) than as a system which organises, sustains, and supports 
difference, inequality and force.  By ordering these ‘force relations’ political economies 
generate value(s).  The primary function of a political economy is therefore not the 
satisfaction of pre-given needs (rooted in an assumption of scarcity, or lack) but in production 
of want (rooted in conditions marked by overproduction and excess) (Bataille, 1991).  Lack is 
a secondary, retrospective effect of political economies which follows from the primary 
function of ordering power and producing desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 28).  Insecurity, 
from this perspective, is not a primary, universal condition but a secondary effect of the 
desire for security generated by political economies of security.  Accounting for the value of 
resilience thus requires a historical investigation into the conditions which have altered our 
sense of security.  How does resilience change our understanding of security?  How does the 
value of resilience derive from our sense of insecurity?  How did we become invested in 
resilience and what does resilience make of us? 
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To answer these questions, this study performs a genealogy of resilience. The aim of a 
genealogy is not representation, but problematization.  Its goal is not to provide a history of 
resilience, but to identify the contingent, historical conditions which contributed to the 
appreciation of this value in the field of security.  This genealogy aims to problematise 
positivistic narratives of resilience which serve to render the value of resilience self-evident 
by appealing to a clear origin established by scientific progress.  It does so by tracing the 
historical consolidation of a more discrete, but powerful, political economy of security 
underpinning the value of resilience.  As a historically constituted transcendental field of 
force relations, political economies are both evolving and noumenal.  They defy 
representation and direct examination. They can, however, be studied through the values they 
give rise to.  Here, we will look to diagnose historical transformations in these political 
economies of security through a detailed study of the successive rationalities of governance 
historically enacted by a British machinery of emergency governance. 
 
A machinery of governance is a localised assemblage of practices, bodies of knowledge, 
organizations and authorities which are mobilised to respond to a particular problem.  
Machineries of governance thus operate as a local actualization of more general economies of 
security.  This genealogy is supported by Foucault’s assessment that the order of 
power/knowledge enacted by political economies of security is biopolitical (Foucault, 1998, 
2003, 2007, 2008).  By tracing changes in the rationalities and practices of emergency 
governance to subtle, yet important shifts in the relations between life, order and contingency 
this book demonstrates that resilience emerged in relation to broader shifts in the biopolitical 
order of power/knowledge informing liberal security governance.  The emergence of 
resilience, I show, is not a result of the progress of science.  It is the correlate of the 
emergence of a neoliberal order of security governance.  To help to establish this position this 
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book draws upon and seeks to contribute to recent scholarship in the biopolitics of security 
which has sought to analyse recent mutations in the order of power/knowledge sustaining 
liberal security discourses (Cooper, 2008; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Dillon & Reid, 
2009; Evans & Reid, 2014; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011).  It is to this research, and its contribution 
to this study, that we now turn. 
 
Resilience and the Biopolitics of Security 
 
In his lecture series Security, Territory, Population (2007) Foucault investigated the 
biopolitical orientation of security.  The lectures advanced his earlier analyses of biopower: a 
mode of power commitment to “making life live”, which could be distinguished from the 
right of the sovereign to “take life or let live” (Foucault, 1998, 2003).  Making life live was 
operationally dependent however on the specific ways in which ‘life’ was understood and 
problematised.  Tracing a genealogy of security, Foucault showed how early security policies 
originally developed to promote and protect the ‘species-life’ exhibited by populations 
(Foucault, 2003, 2007).  A population is a particular enframing of life which emerged in the 
early eighteenth century.  It is one which emphasises the species-existence of humans 
understood in the aggregate.  In recent years, revolutions in the scientific understanding of 
‘life’ (advanced within the digital and molecular revolutions) and shifts in the referent of 
security (from ‘populations’ to a series of ‘complex systems’ displaying life-like properties) 
have coincided with profound changes in the rationalities and practices of liberal security.  In 
light of these changes, contemporary research in the biopolitics of security has asked, “What 
happens to the biopolitics of security when their referent object – life as species existence – 
undergoes profound transformation and change” (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 269)?   
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Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that these transformations must be understood as the product 
of complex processes of ‘speciation’ (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009).  Processes of 
speciation enact three distinct, yet interrelated, definitions enveloped within the term 
‘species’: 
‘Species’ means classification as such, classification as living thing and 
classification as value, specifically monetary or capital value.  These three are 
locked into a very tight and radically interdependent triangulation…. These three 
poles of ‘speciation’ thus comprise a radically interdependent force field in which 
the changing correlation of forces transforms the composition of the respective 
‘trig’ points.  Each of the three—classification, living thing and valuation—
operates in mutually disclosive need of the other two (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 
2009: 8). 
 
Speciation, for Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, refers to a particular ontopolitical enframing 
of life.  Like Nietzsche, they stress the simultaneity of knowing and valuing.   Particular 
understandings of life always already advance a schema for valuing lives, while specific 
determinations of what life is are rooted in processes of ascribing and deriving value 
from particular lives.  As the frameworks of intelligibility for knowing ‘life’ shift so too 
do the regimes of valuation used to evaluate lives. 
 
In his genealogy of security, Foucault demonstrates how biopolitical techniques of 
governance had their precursors in disciplinary technologies forged in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries exercising a ‘subtle coercion’ (1977: 137) on the body for the 
“optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its 
usefulness and its docility, [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic 
controls” (1998: 139).  Emerging through modifications in the ‘anatomo-politics’ of the body 
exercised by disciplinary technologies was a ‘bio-politics’ operating on the mass-body, or 
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species-body, of the ‘population’. This shift in the referent of power relations entailed the 
development of new techniques and technologies of government.  Taken together the 
assemblage of power/knowledge whose biopolitical function is the protection and promotion 
of the species-life of the population would, over time, come to constitute a political economy 
(dispositif) of security (Foucault, 2007).  Security technologies operated in relation to the 
patterns identified within statistical maps of the aleatory ‘events’ which enhanced or 
suppressed species-life (Foucault, 1998: 139, 2003: 246). To the extent that these events 
displayed a statistical regularity, regulatory mechanisms could thus be introduced “to 
compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field” (Foucault, 
2003: 246).  As a mode of power protecting life at the normative and aggregate level 
biopolitical techniques sought to secure populations by regulating how the ‘general’ rates of 
incidence of contingencies correlated with biological and environmental factors.  
Technologies of security aimed to tame the milieu in which the species-life operated by 
‘establishing a sort of homeostasis...by achieving overall equilibrium that protects the 
security of the whole from internal dangers’ (Foucault, 2003: 246). 
 
Foucault’s analyses of the biopolitics of security were principally motivated by an interest in 
performing a genealogy of the idea of security animating the post-war welfare state.  Yet, 
significant changes in the discourses and practices of security since Foucault’s death in 1984 
have raised questions concerning the contemporary relevance of these analyses for 
understanding the dynamics of the contemporary security practices.  Overshadowing the 
contemporary dependence on insurance technologies for the provision of security (Lobo-
Guerrero, 2011), is the emergence of a new discourse of danger rooted in the radical 
contingency of contemporary threats.  Attention has turned from the ‘general’ aleatory 
phenomenon of early biopolitical mechanisms to those high-impact, low probability threats—
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the ‘unknown unknowns’—which evade actuarial capture and strain actuarial-based forms of 
risk management (Daase & Kessler, 2007; Ericson & Doyle, 2004; Massumi, 2009).  To 
respond to the challenge raised by these radically contingent threats, new anticipatory 
techniques of risk management have risen to prominence which are no longer grounded in 
probabilistic methods but instead look to invoke a cross-section of the multiple futures which 
could actualise in order to facilitate precaution, preparation and pre-emption (Anderson, 
2010a, 2010b; Aradau & Munster, 2007; Lakoff, 2007).  Liberal subjects, who can no longer 
be sufficiently protected from these threats by the state, are now to be responsibilised through 
good governance to become autonomous actors with a moral responsibility to better manage 
their own individual risks (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996; Miller & Rose, 2008; O’Malley, 
2004). 
 
Resilience strategies have emerged as a response to the shift in liberal security imaginaries 
towards unknowable and potentially catastrophic futures (Aradau & Munster, 2011).  It 
resonates with logics of precaution (Aradau & Munster, 2007; Ewald, 2002; Massumi, 2005), 
preparedness (Aradau, 2010; Collier, 2008; Lakoff, 2007), and pre-emption (Cooper, 2006a; 
de Goede, 2008; Massumi, 2007) within an increasingly influential anticipatory assemblage 
of security seeking to govern the radical contingency of contemporary threat (Dillon & Reid, 
2009; Dillon, 2006, 2007, 2008).  Departing from the predictive and standardizing techniques 
of the Welfare State, resilience technologies look to manufacture systems and subjectivities 
capable of adapting to change and uncertainty (Lentzos & Rose, 2009; O’Malley, 2010).  In 
an explicit criticism of risk-based logics of protection, resilience strategies aim at the 
production of systems capable of living-with, or even embracing (Baker & Simon, 2002), 
risk.   
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The radical transformation in the rationalities and practices comprising liberal security 
governance has led some to question whether this represents the ‘death of the social’ (N. 
Rose, 1996) and others whether these techniques might still be rightfully recognised as 
biopolitical (Massumi, 2009)?  This book maintains that a biopolitical analytic is most 
appropriate for understanding these changes.  It does so in accord with contemporary research 
interested in the biopolitical implications of more general transformations in the 
understanding of species-life advanced within the associated digital and molecular 
revolutions (Cooper, 2006a, 2008; Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009; Dillon & Reid, 
2001, 2009; N. Rose, 2007).  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero explain that taken together these 
revolutions are advancing a particular speciation of life understood as “a complex adaptive 
and continuously emergent, informationally constituted, system” (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 
2009: 1).  Resilience corresponds to a mode of valuing life in relation to its capacity to adapt 
and transform through processes of complex emergence.  Such a speciation represents a 
distinct way of understanding, problematising and valuing life.  As such, it issues new 
imperatives to biopolitical governance.  
 
Rather than operating to tame the milieu of the population, contemporary biopolitical 
governance is directed towards mastering the conditions of regeneration and transformation 
of a range of open systems displaying the life-properties of complex emergence.  Resilience 
is a measure of evolutionary fitness required to thrive in radically uncertain and precarious 
worlds.  Drawing on a myriad of specialist knowledges, resilience initiatives seek to invest 
life with the capacity to quickly and efficiently adapt, regenerate and transform in the 
presence of an emergency event.   The contingency of emergent species-life and the 
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correlative study of its complex adaptive behaviour respectively provide a target and an 
epistemic base for biopolitical security interventions.  When life became understood in terms 
of its pluripotentiality (Cooper, 2006b, 2008; Waldby, 2002)—that is, as capable of 
differentiation through multiple developmental potentialities—the objective of biopolitical 
security initiatives shifted to asserting “control and command [over] the morphogenetic 
process itself” (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 287).   The knowledge of how to provoke 
conditions of emergence to make life live may also inform initiatives designed to pre-empt 
the emergence of undesirable forms of life in increasingly effective and economical ways 
(Cooper, 2006a).  Mastery over the conditions of emergence for life-itself thus offers a new 
threshold for biopolitical governance—but it also provides a new science for a thanatopolitics 
directed to killing those forms of life found inimical to liberal life.  The value of resilience 
represents the new telos of these biopolitical security initiatives. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
While this study proceeds chronologically it does not purport to provide an extensive history 
of UK civil contingencies management.ii  It instead looks to analyse those relatively rare 
events which broke open long periods of organizational stasis and drift with a punctuated 
burst of debate, reflection, creativity and change.  Acting as problematizations these events 
served to call existing modes of practice into question thereby opening a space for new ways 
of understanding and evaluating to take shape.  Analysing these events thus allows us to trace 
important shifts in the institutional structures of security including the introduction, 
development and migration of rationalities and practices of governance which comprise them.  
More profoundly, an analysis of such events permits us to trace the evolution of the idea of 
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security itself.  The event, according to Deluze, signals a shift in the hierarchy of forces 
which give something its sense (Deleuze, 1983: 3-6).  It represents “the reversal of a 
relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned 
against those who had once used it (Foucault, 1994: 381).  Yet, Foucault notes, “the forces 
operating in history do not obey destiny or regulative mechanisms, but the luck of the battle” 
(Foucault, 1994: 381).  A genealogy of resilience therefore will not trace the linear 
development, and growing perfection of a thing over time, but instead draw attention to the 
historical contingency—the debates, controversies and, most importantly, the politics—of 
what has been construed as logical, necessary and natural.   
 
Each chapter in this book is organised around an important event in the reorientation of 
economies of security from values associated with stability, including fortitude, 
robustness and stoicism, to those of resilience.  Chapter 1 begins by locating the 
biopolitical imperative driving the formal institutionalization of a British machinery of 
emergency governance in the years following the First World War in order to secure 
the ‘essentials of life’ from industrial unrest.  Each subsequent chapter goes on to trace 
the historical conditions under which resilience displaced stability as the primary value 
of British emergency governance.  Chapter 2 analyses the development of techniques of 
preparedness in respect to the security problematic posed by the advent of 
thermonuclear war and the threat it posed to the ‘survivability’ of the British nation.  
Chapter 3 traces the consolidation of resilience discourses in the 1970s in relation to an 
emergent epistemological order forged in relation to the advent of neoliberal techniques 
of governance.  Chapter 4 details the operationalisation of resilience strategies within 
the realm of state security via the application of concepts and strategies developed 
within the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which proved influential in the 
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reorganization of UK civil contingencies management after the collapse of the Cold 
War.  Chapter 5 investigates how governmental technologies are being employed to 
fashion ‘resilient subjects’.  A short conclusion will draw on the analysis undertaken in 
these chapters in returning to the question of the value of resilience. 
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